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THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE
AND THE APPLICABILITY OF U.S. LAW TO
VISITING FOREIGN SHIPS
INTRODUCTION
oreign ships 1 have maintained a significant presence in American
ports and waters since early in the nation’s history. 2 This presence
grew substantially during the last century, 3 after many previously
American vessels reflagged under flags of convenience. 4 As a result, the
vast majority of ships today calling on U.S. ports are foreign-flagged. For
example, ninety-five percent of the passenger ships and seventy-five percent of the cargo vessels entering American waters are alien. 5 These
numbers underscore the desirability of developing a systematic approach
for determining when domestic law applies to visiting foreign ships.
The Supreme Court recently tackled this issue in Spector v. Norwegian
Cruise Line Ltd., 6 a case addressing whether Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) 7 applies to foreign-flagged cruise ships in
American waters. When the Court granted certiorari 8 to resolve a pair of

F

1. For the purposes of this Note, foreign ships are simply those vessels whose nationality is not American. A vessel’s nationality, generally speaking, is determined by the
country of her registry and under whose flag she sails. See M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), 38 I.L.M. 1323, 1340 (Int’l Trib. L. of the Sea 1999).
2. The impetus behind Congress’s enactment of the first cabotage (coastwise trade)
laws provides an illustration. Already wary of the influence foreign vessels held over
international shipping at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Congress passed the
first of these laws in 1817 to protect domestic maritime interests by limiting intranational
shipping and the coastwise trade to American vessels. See Act of Mar. 1, 1817, ch. 31,
§ 4, 3 Stat. 351 (repealed 1933). For an in-depth discussion of American cabotage laws,
see C. Todd Jones, The Practical Effects on Labor of Repealing American Cabotage
Laws, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 403, 403–15 (1995).
3. See H. Edwin Anderson, The Nationality of Ships and Flags of Convenience:
Economics, Politics, and Alternatives, 21 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 158–61 (1996) (explaining
that flags of convenience and open registries arose in the 1920s and 1930s as a result of
efforts by American businessmen looking to lower operational costs).
4. A flag of convenience is a flag under which a vessel is registered in order to reduce operating costs and avoid the governmental regulations of the state of its beneficial
ownership. Liberia and Panama are the most familiar flag of convenience states. See Jane
Marc Wells, Comment, Vessel Registration in Selected Open Registries, 6 MAR. LAW.
221, 221–27 (1981).
5. Austin P. Olney, A Report from the Marine Regulatory Front: Partly Cloudy with
a Chance of Thunder Storms, 13 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 91, 110 (2000).
6. 545 U.S. 119 (2005).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2006).
8. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 542 U.S. 965 (2004).
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conflicting rulings from the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, 9 some commentators believed that it would use the opportunity to clearly define when
and how U.S. law applies to visiting foreign vessels. 10 Unfortunately,
this expectation went unfulfilled as much of the Court’s ruling, a plurality opinion with multiple subparts and voting blocs, has no binding precedential value. 11
Holding that the ADA’s basic requirements do apply to foreign cruise
ships, a five-Justice majority eschewed as too “broad” the Fifth Circuit’s
determination that the “clear statement rule” 12 prohibits domestic legislation from applying to foreign vessels absent specific statutory language. 13 However, a badly fractured Court authored four opinions and
ultimately failed to agree on precisely how the rule should operate. 14 Incorporating the “internal affairs rule” 15 into its reading of the clear statement rule, a four-Justice plurality argued that the rule precluded the ADA
and other generally applicable statutes 16 from applying to the internal
9. Compare Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 356 F.3d 641 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that Title III does not apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in American waters),
with Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title
III does apply to foreign-flagged cruise ships in American waters).
10. See, e.g., Michael A. Orlando, Enforcement of Federal Law on Foreign-Flagged
Ships in U.S. Waters, INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., Nov. 2004, http://www.irmi.com/Expert/
Articles/2004/Orlando11.aspx.
11. See generally Adam S. Hochschild, The Modern Problem of Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 261
(2000) (discussing the ambiguous precedential value of plurality opinions).
12. The clear statement rule is a canon of statutory construction employed by American courts to resolve ambiguities in legislative language. In actuality, there is no one clear
statement rule, but rather an array of such rules, all of which require a clear expression of
congressional intent within the text of a statute before courts will interpret that statute in a
way that encroaches on an area of traditional state authority, raises inconsistencies with
international law, or impinges on intergovernmental immunities, just to name a few. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 598–611 (1992).
13. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130.
14. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the Court and authored an opinion
joined by Justices Souter and Stevens, and joined in part by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg,
and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, wrote an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas concurred in part, dissented in part,
and concurred in the judgment in part. Justice Scalia delivered a dissenting opinion,
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Thomas in part.
15. The internal affairs rule provides that foreign ships are not subject to the jurisdiction of the port state in matters touching only their internal order and discipline unless the
peace or tranquility of the port state is disturbed. See infra note 36 and accompanying
text.
16. Generally applicable statutes are laws whose legislative language contains words
of universal application. Typical of most congressional legislation, these laws, if taken at
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affairs of visiting foreign ships absent a clear expression of congressional
intent. 17 Furthermore, the plurality stated that the rule should be applied
on a provision-by-provision basis, such that those statutory provisions
not implicating a ship’s internal affairs would not trigger the rule and
consequently would apply in full. 18 Though the other five Justices did
not share this vision of the clear statement rule, their disagreement
amongst themselves ruined any chance that they might provide a majority standard. Thus, instead of definitively defining when U.S. law applies
to visiting foreign ships, the Court left the question largely unanswered. 19
This Note examines the internal affairs rule and its interaction with the
clear statement rule. Part I explores the jurisdictional issues inherent in
applying domestic law to visiting foreign vessels and explains that international law resolves these issues through the internal affairs rule. Furthermore, Part I demonstrates that the United States adheres to the internal affairs rule, believing it to be a well-established international legal
principle. 20 Part II examines how the Supreme Court has traditionally
applied the internal affairs rule. Through consideration of the Court’s
Jones Act 21 and National Labor Relations Act 22 precedent, this part aims
to establish that the rule restrains the reach of legislation in some circum-

face value, would regulate any and all activities around the world. For example, in
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), Justice Jackson made the following observation of the Jones Act:
Unless some relationship . . . to our national interest is implied, Congress has
extended our law and opened our courts to all alien seafaring men injured anywhere in the world in service of watercraft of every foreign nation -- a hand on
a Chinese junk, never outside Chinese waters, would not be beyond its literal
wording.
Id. at 577. Rather than give effect to the implausible results that follow from such literal
statutory readings, American courts employ canons of statutory construction to establish
the law’s proper reach. See id. at 577–79.
17. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130.
18. Id. at 138–39.
19. Commenting on Spector, one observer quipped, “[A]lthough the Court has rearranged the playing field, the rules of the game remain largely undefined.” Philip M. Berkowitz, ADA and Foreign Employers: New Guidance from the Court, N.Y.L.J., July 15,
2005, at 5.
20
Generally speaking, American courts recognize international law as constituting a kind
of federal common law. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating
that “[i]nternational law is part of our law” and holding that coastal fishing vessels are
exempt from capture as prize of war under customary international law).
21. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (2006).
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
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stances while having no such limiting effect in others. 23 Part III returns
to the Court’s decision in Spector, and discusses the plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyzes these opinions in light of
Parts I and II, and concludes that the plurality provides the proper understanding of the clear statement and internal affairs rules. Finally, Part V
synthesizes the main points of this Note and recapitulates the lesson
learned from Spector.
I. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT AND THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE
Any attempt by the United States to prescribe laws applicable to visiting foreign ships presents the risk of conflict between sovereigns. 24 This
conflict emanates from an overlap between two independent principles of
jurisdiction, territoriality and nationality. 25 The United States, as a port
state, 26 derives its authority to prescribe laws applicable to foreign vessels through the jurisdictional principle of territoriality. 27 Stemming from
a nation’s need to control activities within its geographic boundaries,
territorial jurisdiction allows port states to regulate conduct that occurs or
has effect within their waters. 28 Vessels, on the other hand, are bound by
the rules and regulations of their flag state through the jurisdictional

23. It is important to remark here that this Note is only concerned with laws containing words of universal application. See supra note 16. An express congressional statement that a statute does apply to visiting foreign ships effectively forecloses any question
as to its applicability. For example, Congress amended the Seamen’s Act of 1915, Act of
March 4, 1915, ch. 153, 38 Stat. 1164 (codified in part at 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2006)), in
1920 to make it applicable to wage disputes between the owners and crewmembers of
foreign ships docked in American ports. In Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348
(1920), the Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the Act to a dispute between a
British crewman and his British ship master for wages owed under a British employment
contract for work aboard a British vessel. Given the Act’s express demarcation of its
reach, the Court explained that any interpretation rendering the Act inapplicable to foreign ships and their crew would undermine Congress’s intent “to place American and
foreign seamen on an equality of right.” Id. at 355.
24. Ted L. McDorman, Regional Port State Control Agreements: Some Issues of International Law, 5 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 207, 210–11 (2000).
25. See id; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. b
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (“Territoriality and nationality are discrete and independent bases of jurisdiction; the same conduct or activity may provide a basis for exercise of jurisdiction both by the territorial state and by the state of nationality of the
actor.”).
26. A port state is a state that exercises control over a particular port. See McDorman,
supra note 24, at 210.
27. RESTATEMENT § 402 cmt. h.
28. See id.
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principle of nationality. 29 By providing vessels with a comprehensive
body of laws to govern their shipboard activities, nationality and the law
of the flag play an essential role in maritime law. 30 Ships entering foreign ports, therefore, find themselves subject to concurrent port state and
flag state jurisdiction. 31
Though in principle port state jurisdiction is superior to flag state jurisdiction, 32 “the legal certainty does not accurately reflect the tension.” 33
Ships have a way of traveling from place to place. Thus if port states attempted to enforce their jurisdiction to the fullest extent upon every visiting vessel, then ships would be forced to navigate through an overwhelming regulatory patchwork. 34 Similarly untenable, if every flag state
could claim exclusive jurisdiction over its ships at all times, then port
states would be completely defenseless against harmful vessel activities. 35 Aiming for a reasonable solution to this jurisdictional dilemma,
the major maritime nations developed the internal affairs rule, which provides that visiting foreign ships are not subject to port state jurisdiction in
matters touching only upon the internal order and discipline of the ship
unless those internal matters disturb the peace and tranquility of the
port. 36

29. See id. §§ 402(2), 502(2).
30. David F. Matlin, Note, Re-evaluating the Status of Flags of Convenience Under
International Law, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1017, 1021–22 (1991). While on the high
seas, and until it enters another nation’s ports and internal waters, a ship is viewed conceptually as a floating extension of its flag state’s territory. See The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 10, at 25; The Queen v. Anderson,
[1868] L.R. 1 C.C.R. 161, 163 (U.K.) (Blackburn, J.) (“[A] ship, which bears a nation’s
flag, is to be treated as part of the territory of that nation. A ship is a kind of floating
island.”).
31. See RESTATEMENT § 502 cmt. d (“The flag state’s jurisdiction also overlaps in
some respects with the jurisdiction of the coastal state when the ship is in the territorial
sea, contiguous zone, or a deepwater port of that state.”).
32. See 48 C.J.S. International Law § 23 (2006) (“[T]he jurisdiction of a nation to
take enforcement action within its territory is absolute.”).
33. McDorman, supra note 24, at 211.
34. See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 585 (observing that “there must be some law on shipboard, [and] that it cannot change at every change of waters”).
35. Noting the problems posed by this hypothetical situation, Chief Justice Marshall
once remarked that “it would be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and
would subject the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation . . . [if
foreign vessels] were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country.” The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 144 (1812).
36. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 65–66 (3d ed. 1999).
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A. The Internal Affairs Rule: Two Theories and International Acceptance
While the finer points of enforcement policy may vary from nation to
nation, a survey of the legal practices of the international community
reveals that the internal affairs rule is widely accepted. 37 Recently, in Re
Maritime Union of Australia, 38 the High Court of Australia recognized
the internal affairs rule as a valid tenet of international law, and stated
that the Australian Industrial Relations Commission should take the rule
into account in deciding on remand whether certain Australian labor laws
apply to the crews of foreign vessels. 39 Similarly, the Federal Court of
Canada ruled in Metaxas v. The Galaxias 40 that whether severance pay
was owed to several Greek sailors released from their employment
aboard a Greek vessel in Vancouver was a question most appropriately
answered by the law of the flag. 41
As regards the internal affairs rule, there are two competing theories to
which nations subscribe, the French and the English. 42 The French theory
emerged from the consolidated cases of The Sally and The Newton. 43
Both cases involved assaults by one seaman against another occurring on
board American ships docked in France. 44 The Counseil d’Etat 45 began
its analysis by remarking that “the rights of the [flag state] ought to be
respected touching the internal discipline of the vessel in which the local

37. See, e.g., PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME
JURISDICTION 144–91 (1927) (discussing the practices of Belgium, Brazil, Chile, England, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Mexico, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, and the
United States); Sellers v. Maritime Safety Inspector, [1999] 2 N.Z.L.R. 44 (C.A.) (holding that the Maritime Safety Inspector could not, consistently with international law,
require a Maltese ship, sailing from a New Zealand port, to carry radio and emergency
equipment).
38. (2003) 214 C.L.R. 397 (Austl.).
39. Id. at 419; see also Celtic Marine (Hong Kong) Ltd., (2004) P.R. 947273 (Austl.
Indus. Relations Comm’n) (acknowledging that the internal affairs rule is a rule of international law), available at http://www.airc.gov.au/alldocuments/PR947273.htm.
40. [1990] 2 F.C. 400 (Trial Div.) (Can.).
41. Id; see also Fernandez v. Mercury Bell, [1986] 3 F.C. 454 (C.A.) (Can.) (citing
“the well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily
governs the [internal] affairs of a ship”); Rederiet A.P. Moller A/S, [1996] 32
C.L.R.B.R.2d 136 (Can. Labor Relations Bd.).
42. JESSUP, supra note 37, at 145.
43. An English translation of this 1806 case is available at A.H. Charteris, The Legal
Position of Merchantmen in Foreign Ports and National Waters, 1 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
45, 50–51 (1920).
44. Id. at 50.
45. The Counseil d’Etat is France’s highest court of administrative justice, settling
disputes between individuals and the government. Philippe Fouchard, The Judiciary in
Contemporary Society: France, 25 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 221, 222 (1993).
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authorities ought not to interfere unless . . . the peace and tranquility of
the port has been compromised.” 46 Then, since in its opinion the assaults
failed to create a stir outside the ships themselves, the French court held
that the local tribunals had no jurisdiction to entertain criminal prosecutions against the sailors. 47 The French theory thus asserts that port states
lack jurisdiction over the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships when
those matters do not disturb the port state’s interests. 48
Conversely, the English theory developed from the initial presumption
that port states possess absolute jurisdiction over visiting foreign ships. 49
This presumption provided the starting point for the court’s analysis in
The Queen v. Keyn, 50 a case involving a German captain arraigned on
criminal charges for running his vessel into an English ship while passing through English waters. 51 After deducing that any criminal conduct
that may have occurred would have taken place aboard the German vessel, the court dismissed the indictment and held that the law of the flag
controlled. 52 The court explained its decision, in part, by declaring that
states may “choose[] to forego the exercise of her law over the foreign
vessel and crew, or exercise[] it only when they disturb the peace and
good order of the port.” 53 Accordingly, under the English theory, while
jurisdiction is fully vested in port states as a matter of right, it should not
be exercised over foreign vessels unless interests beyond those of the
ship and her crew are involved. 54
The French and English theories differ, therefore, only on the question
of whether port state jurisdiction over the internal affairs of foreign vessels is yielded as a matter of right or discretion. Despite this abstract difference, there is no pragmatic distinction between the two theories since
both in practice decline jurisdiction when the interests of the port state
are not adversely affected. 55 It is this common practice that has solidified
into the customary rule of international law 56 that port states should not
46. Charteris, supra note 43, at 51.
47. Id.
48. JESSUP, supra note 37, at 154.
49. Id. at 169; see also Chung Chi Cheung v. The King, [1939] A.C. 160, 167 (U.K.)
(declaring that a port state’s jurisdiction is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself).
50. [1876] 2 Ex. D. 63 (Crown Cases Reserved).
51. Id. at 64.
52. Id. at 86.
53. Id. at 82.
54. Charteris, supra note 43, at 45–46.
55. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 36, at 66; JESSUP, supra note 37, at 192.
56. Customary international law is derived from the consistent practice of states acting out of a belief that international law requires them to act that way. See MARK W.
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exercise jurisdiction over the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships
unless those affairs disturb the peace of the port. 57
B. The Internal Affairs Rule in the United States
The United States is generally regarded as a subscriber to the English
theory. 58 Thus, paralleling the English view, the Supreme Court has held
that visiting foreign ships subject themselves to American jurisdiction as
a condition of entry. 59 Furthermore, this jurisdictional authority being
absolute, 60 the Court has taken the position that the United States is entitled to unqualifiedly enforce its laws against foreign vessels. 61 Nevertheless, recognizing that international law compels a more moderate apJANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 44–48 (4th ed. 2003). Indeed, consistent state practice is the “best evidence” that a rule has become part of customary international law. RESTATEMENT § 103 cmt. a.
57. It is worth mentioning here that this customary rule was codified in part in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. Article 27(1) of UNCLOS resolves conflicts with respect to
criminal jurisdiction on board visiting foreign ships in the following way:
The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a
foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the
ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) if the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State;
(b) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order
of the territorial sea;
(c) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of
the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or
(d) if such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
UNCLOS, art. 27(1).
58. See Charteris, supra note 43, at 58; JESSUP, supra note 37, at 191.
59. E.g., Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 179 (1903); United States v. Diekelman, 92 U.S. 520, 525 (1875).
60. Chief Justice Marshall delivered the most famous pronouncement of the nation’s
complete and plenary authority over its waters in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), where he declared that “[t]he jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute . . . [and] is susceptible
of no limitation not imposed by itself.”
61. See, e.g., Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923) (holding that visiting
foreign vessels are barred from possessing any alcohol in American ports and waters,
regardless of whether flag state law requires its ships to store such spirits, since the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act state a strong public policy against
such possession).
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proach to jurisdictional enforcement, the Court has stated that applications of domestic legislation to conduct occurring on board foreign ships
should comply with the internal affairs rule. 62 This was first explained by
the Court over a century ago in Wildenhus’s Case. 63 There, Chief Justice
Waite made the following observation:
From experience, however, it was found long ago that it would be
beneficial to commerce if the local government would abstain from interfering with the internal discipline of the ship, and the general regulation of the rights and duties of the officers and crew towards the vessel,
or among themselves. And so by comity it came to be generally understood among civilized nations that all matters of discipline, and all
things done on board, which affected only the vessel, or those belonging to her, and did not involve the peace and dignity of the country, or
the tranquility of the port, should be left by the local government to be
dealt with by the authorities of the nation to which the vessel belonged
as the laws of that nation, or the interests of its commerce should require. . . . Such being the general public law on this subject, treaties and
conventions have been entered into by nations having commercial intercourse, the purpose of which was to settle and define the rights and
duties of the contracting parties with respect to each other in these particulars, and thus prevent the inconvenience that might arise from at64
tempts to exercise conflicting jurisdictions.

An exhaustive list of all ship matters considered “internal” has never
been compiled. Notwithstanding this, it can be pointed out that the internal affairs rule’s reasoning has been invoked to relinquish jurisdiction in
cases involving terms of employment and wages, 65 collective bargain-

62. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 19–21
(1963); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585–86 (1953); United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 260 (1893).
63. Mali v. Keeper of the Common Jail (Wildenhus’s Case), 120 U.S. 1 (1887).
64. Id. at 12.
65. See Lopes v. S.S. Ocean Daphne, 337 F.2d 777 (4th Cir. 1964); The Albani, 169
F. 220 (E.D. Pa. 1909); The Becherdass Ambaidass, 3 F. Cas. 13 (D. Mass. 1871) (No.
1,203); Saunders v. The Victoria, 21 F. Cas. 539 (E.D. Pa. 1854) (No. 12,377); The Pacific, 18 F. Cas. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1830) (No. 10,644); Thomson v. The Nanny, 23 F. Cas.
1104 (D.S.C. 1805) (No. 13,984); Willendson v. Forsoket, 29 F. Cas. 1283 (D. Pa. 1801)
(No. 17,682). Where the complaining seaman has been badly mistreated, however, courts
have exercised jurisdiction in the interests of justice. See The Salomoni, 29 F. 534 (S.D.
Ga. 1886); Weiberg v. The St. Oloff, 29 F. Cas. 597 (D. Pa. 1790) (No. 17,357). Jurisdiction has also regularly been exercised where the complaining crewmember is an American citizen. See The Neck, 138 F. 144 (W.D. Wash. 1905); The Alnwick, 132 F. 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1904); The Falls of Keltie, 114 F. 357 (D. Wash. 1902).
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ing, 66 personal injury, 67 and ship discipline. 68 Being of considerable interest to the flag state 69 and of little interest to the United States, 70
American courts, through the internal affairs rule, have recognized the
primacy of flag state law in these matters in order to avoid unnecessary
conflicts. 71 On the other hand, where the interests of the United States
are significantly affected by internal ship matters, American courts have
not shied away from exercising jurisdiction. 72 Indeed, it is well-settled
that jurisdiction over foreign vessels and their crew will be asserted when
their activities offend “the peace or good order of the port either literally
. . . or in some constructive sense.” 73 This “port disturbance” exception
has been construed broadly, allowing American authorities full discretion
to determine for themselves what circumstances warrant an invasion of a
foreign ship’s internal affairs. 74 Intervention has been most common in
cases involving criminal activity 75 and customs or immigration viola66. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10
(1963); Fruit Dispatch Co. v. National Maritime Union of America, 138 So.2d 853 (La.
Ct. App. 1962); Compania Maritima Sansoc Limitada, 1950-1951 CCH N.L.R.B. Decisions ¶ 10,081 (1950).
67. See The Paula, 91 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1937); The Magdapur, 3 F. Supp. 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1933); The Falco, 15 F.2d 604 (E.D.N.Y. 1926). Where the injured seaman is
an American citizen, however, jurisdiction will likely be exercised. See Shorter v. Bermuda & West Indies S.S. Co., 57 F.2d 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1932). But see Clark v. Montezuma
Transp. Co., 216 N.Y.S. 295 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926).
68. See Ex parte Anderson, 184 F. 114 (D. Me. 1910). Where ship discipline rises to
the level of torture, however, jurisdiction will be exercised in the interests of justice. See
Bolden v. Jensen, 70 F. 505 (D. Wash. 1895).
69. See Brainerd Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, 27
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 67 (1959) (discussing flag states’ interests in determining compensation for shipboard torts); Note, The Effect of United States Labor Legislation on the Flagof-Convenience Fleet: Regulation of Shipboard Labor Relations and Remedies Against
Shoreside Picketing, 69 YALE L.J. 498, 514–15 (1959) (discussing flag states’ interests in
setting shipboard labor policies).
70. See RESTATEMENT § 512 cmt. c (observing that “coastal states usually have little
interest” in the internal affairs of foreign ships).
71. Clay J. Garside, Comment, Forcing the American People to Take the Hard NOx:
The Failure to Regulate Foreign Vessels Under the Clear Air Act as Abuse of Discretion,
79 TUL. L. REV. 779, 790–91 (2005).
72. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 36, at 66–67.
73. Id. at 66.
74. A broad interpretation of what constitutes a “port disturbance” is necessary, because “[c]ircumstances alter cases and a dispute which at times might have no effect on
shore, at other times might have serious local consequences.” JESSUP, supra note 37, at
180.
75. For example, criminal convictions were upheld in five cases against Italian sailors
who, upon learning of the U.S.’s entry into WWII, purposefully destroyed the propulsive
machinery of their ships in order to scuttle them in their ports. See Polonio v. United
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tions. 76 Additionally, in their efforts to protect the peace of the port,
American authorities have sometimes imposed obligations on foreign
vessels which extend beyond their stay. Requiring that all oil tankers
have double hulls, 77 barring any and all possession of liquor during Prohibition, 78 and enforcing antitrust laws on foreign shipping companies 79
are three prominent examples.
Before moving on, it should be noted that the Court’s explanation in
Wildenhus’s Case that the internal affairs rule was founded on considerations of comity 80 has resulted in some confusion. Several commentators
have understood this to mean that the rule is not a true tenet of international law, but rather a courtesy extended by the United States to other
sovereign nations. 81 A closer reading of Chief Justice Waite’s opinion,
however, reveals that the Court did not leave the internal affairs rule to
rest on comity alone, nor did it hold that treaties were necessary to confirm the rule’s existence. To be sure, the Court stated that the rule arose
from comity originally and indicated that it might be better protected by

States, 131 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1942); Guigni v. United States, 127 F.2d 786 (1st Cir.
1942); Marchese v. United States, 126 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1942); United States v. Scaleggeri, 126 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1941); Bersio v. United States, 124 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1941).
Additionally, in Wildenhus’s Case, the Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of
a Belgian seaman who murdered a fellow shipmate on board a Belgian ship in New Jersey, reasoning that the grievousness of the crime disturbed the tranquility of the port.
Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. at 17–18. Foreign courts, employing the same port disturbance reasoning, have similarly upheld criminal convictions for murders committed on
board alien vessels docked in port. See Chung Chi Cheung, [1937] 29 H.K.L.R. 22; State
v. Dave Johnson Plazen, 4 Int’l L. Rep. 160 (Costa Rica 1928). But see Case of Antoni, 6
El Foro 194 (Mex. 1876) (dismissing indictment on the grounds that the murder did not
disturb the peace of the port), reprinted in MANLEY O. HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER
MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 630 (1929).
76. See Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Buttfield
v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
77. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (2006).
78. See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100 (1923). In a decision strikingly similar to Cunard S.S. Co., the Seychelles Supreme Court in R. v. Fayolle, 91 Int’l L. Rep.
384 (Sey. 1971), upheld the conviction of a foreign ship’s master under the Green Turtle
Protection Regulations for possessing in port green turtle meat fished outside the territorial waters of Seychelles, reasoning that the Regulations stated an absolute policy against
green turtle meat possession.
79. See United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Packet-Fahrtactien-Gesellschaft,
200 F. 806 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. Anchor Line, Ltd., 232 F. Supp. 379
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
80. Comity can be defined as “a willingness to grant a privilege, not as a matter of
right, but out of deference and good will.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
81. See, e.g., Maitlin, supra note 30, at 1025.
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treaties in the interest of preventing misunderstanding. 82 Nevertheless, as
the law stood in the mind of the Court, the internal affairs rule was existent and established in “the general public law.” 83 Furthermore, this understanding of the internal affairs rule’s status as an international legal
principle has been affirmed in subsequent Court decisions. 84
II. APPLICATION OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE
Like other principles of statutory interpretation, the internal affairs rule
is a canon of constructive caution. 85 The rule, functionally speaking, presumes that legislation is not intended to regulate the internal affairs of
visiting foreign ships unless there is a clear statement from Congress to
the contrary. 86 Furthermore, as the following examination of the Supreme Court’s Jones Act and National Labor Relations Act jurisprudence
makes clear, the internal affairs rule does not take an all-or-nothing approach to the applicability of domestic law. Rather, while the rule may
work to restrict a particular statute’s reach in one instance, it might not in
another.
A. The Jones Act
The Jones Act allows injured seamen to bring actions for damages
when their injuries are suffered in the course of employment and are due
to the negligence of their employer. 87 In Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 88 an
American stevedore 89 was injured on board a German vessel while he

82. Wildenhus’s Case, 120 U.S. at 12.
83. Id. General public law and international law are synonymous. See JANIS, supra
note 56, at 2.
84. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. The U.S. Government appears to have
adopted this position as well, having relied on this understanding of the internal affairs
rule to “protest[] the assertion of jurisdiction over controversies [involving American
vessels], by local magistrates in the territory of a foreign State with which no adequate
agreements had been concluded.” CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY
AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 739–40 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
85. See Garside, supra note 71, at 790–91 (briefly sketching and comparing the internal affairs rule, the Charming Betsy canon, and the presumption against extraterritoriality).
86. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10,
20–22 (1963).
87. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a). For a detailed discussion of liability and recovery under
the Jones Act, see Brian J. Miles, The Standard of Care in a Seaman’s Personal Injury
Action—Has the Jones Act Been Slighted?, 13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 79 (1988).
88. 282 U.S. 234 (1931).
89. A stevedore is a laborer who loads and unloads vessels docked in port. THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1701 (4th ed. 2000). Five years prior to Uravic, in
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was unloading it in New York harbor. 90 This injury subsequently led to
his death. 91 Suit was brought under the Act by the stevedore’s administratrix 92 who asserted the negligence of a fellow-servant as the cause of
the injury. 93 Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Holmes reasoned
that the internal affairs rule was inapplicable under the circumstances
since the stevedore’s activities went “beyond the scope of discipline and
private matters that do not interest the territorial power.” 94 Indeed,
Holmes remarked that it would be “extraordinary” to deny American
legal protections to citizens only “momentarily” engaged on board foreign ships. 95 The decision of the New York court 96 holding the Act inapplicable was accordingly reversed. 97
A separate set of facts yielded a different result in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. 98 In Romero, a Spanish seaman brought
suit against his Spanish employer after he was injured on board a Spanish
ship docked in Hoboken, New Jersey. 99 The seaman was loading a cargo
of wheat onto the ship when a wire cable suddenly slipped, severing his
left leg and causing multiple fractures to his right leg. 100 Adhering to the
internal affairs rule, the Court held that providing compensation for the
injured seaman and regulating the liability of the shipowner were the
concerns of the state of their common nationality, and that the United
States had no interest in intruding its own policies into that relationInternational Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), the Supreme Court ruled
that a stevedore was a “seaman” for the purposes of the Jones Act.
90. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 238.
91. Id.
92. An administratrix is a woman appointed by a court to manage the assets and liabilities of a deceased person. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 46 (6th ed. 1990).
93. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 238. Interestingly, just eleven years earlier, Uravic’s cause of
action would have failed at the outset since maritime law followed the fellow-servant
rule, which barred recovery for injuries caused by other crewmembers. See, e.g., The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). With the passage of the Jones Act in 1920, however, Congress abolished the fellow-servant rule as a defense to shipboard negligence liability. Joel
K. Goldstein, The Osceola and the Transformation of Maritime Personal Injury Law:
Some Propositions About the Case and Its Propositions, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 663, 722
(2003).
94. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 240.
95. Id.
96. Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 170 N.E. 131 (N.Y. 1929) (decided on authority of Resigno v. F. Jarka Co., 162 N.E. 13 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)).
97. Uravic, 282 U.S. at 241.
98. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
99. Id. at 356.
100. After the accident, the seaman was taken by ambulance to a hospital in Hoboken
where he underwent treatment for the next eight months. Currie, supra note 68, at 1 (pulling these facts from the trial record and appellate briefs).
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ship. 101 The fact that the injury occurred in American waters was dismissed as a “wholly fortuitous circumstance.” 102 Consequently, unlike its
determination in Uravic, the Court in Romero found that the circumstances of the case triggered the internal affairs rule and rendered the
Jones Act inapplicable. 103
B. The National Labor Relations Act
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was enacted to guarantee
the right of workers to organize and to bargain collectively without fear
of management reprisal. 104 To make the NLRA effective, Congress established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a quasi-judicial
body empowered to resolve labor disputes. 105 Such disputes erupted with
recurrent regularity in ports throughout the United States during the
1950s, as labor unions, upset over depressed pay scales and working conditions, picketed foreign vessels and attempted to organize their crews. 106
Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A. 107 provided the Supreme
Court with its first opportunity to consider the NLRB’s jurisdiction over
labor relations aboard visiting foreign ships. 108 In Benz, a Liberian vessel
was docked in Portland, Oregon, when its crew suddenly went on strike
demanding higher wages and improved working conditions. 109 The
crewmen appointed an American labor union as their collective bargaining representative, and the union and others promptly began picketing
the vessel. 110 After the shipowner brought suit in federal district court
seeking to enjoin the union’s activities, the union claimed that only the
NLRB could consider the controversy. 111 The Court, however, held that
the NLRB lacked jurisdiction under the internal affairs rule, remarking

101. See Romero, 358 U.S. at 384.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (setting forth Congress’s findings and declaration of policy with respect to the Act).
105. See id. §§ 153–156.
106. See Note, supra note 69, at 503.
107. 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
108. Suit was brought under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–
197 (2006), an amendment to the NLRA.
109. Benz, 353 U.S. at 139.
110. Id. at 140.
111. Id. at 141. Adjudication of certain activities falling within the ambit of the NLRA
are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. See Stephen F. Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and Employment Law Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 430–34 (1998).
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that “Congress did not fashion [the NLRB] to resolve labor disputes between nationals of other countries operating ships under foreign laws.” 112
The rule was similarly employed in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional
de Marineros de Honduras 113 to find that the NLRB did not have authority under the NLRA to order an election for the unionization of foreign
seamen recruited in Honduras to serve aboard Honduran vessels. In
McCulloch, the National Maritime Union 114 petitioned the NLRB for
certification as the bargaining agent for the crewmen. 115 The vessels
were operated by a wholly owned subsidiary of an American corporation, but their labor relations were governed by several provisions of the
Honduran Labor Code. 116 When the NLRB decided to assert jurisdiction
and ordered an election to be held among the seamen, 117 both the shipowners and the Honduran labor union which claimed to represent the
crewmen filed suit seeking an injunction. 118 The Court unanimously upheld their claims and found the NLRB lacked jurisdiction. 119 Rejecting
the “balancing of contacts” test 120 employed by the NLRB, the Court
reasoned that such a test would invariably “inquire into the internal discipline and order” of the ships in contravention of “the well-established
rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs
the internal affairs of a ship.” 121
Distinguishing the factual elements that triggered the internal affairs
rule in Benz and McCulloch, the Court upheld the applicability of the
NLRA in International Longshoremen’s Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping

112. Benz, 353 U.S. at 143.
113. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
114. Founded in 1937, the National Maritime Union (NMU) organized seamen and
waterfront workers, and was one of the most radical labor unions in the United States.
The NMU lent support to various anti-colonial and international revolutionary struggles,
and called for racial integration of the East Coast shipping industry. Ahmed A. White,
Mutiny, Shipboard Strikes, and the Supreme Court’s Subversion of New Deal Labor Law,
25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB L. 275, 311–17 (2004).
115. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 13.
116. Id. at 14. Under these Honduran labor laws, only certain specified Honduran unions were permitted to act as bargaining representatives for seamen serving on board
Honduran vessels. Id.
117. See United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 287 (1961).
118. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 12.
119. Id. at 21.
120. The balancing of contacts test employed by the NLRB consisted of weighing
several factors, such as the nationality of the parties, the place of the dispute, and the
beneficial ownership of the shipping corporation, to determine whether jurisdiction was
appropriately asserted. See United Fruit Co., 134 N.L.R.B. at 288–90.
121. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21.
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Co. 122 In Ariadne, American unions picketed several foreign ships
docked in Florida to protest substandard wages paid to American longshoremen. 123 The owners of the vessels attempted to enjoin the picketing
in state court, but a unanimous Supreme Court held that the NLRA preempted the field and that the NLRB thus had exclusive jurisdiction to
consider the matter. 124 Noting that Benz and McCulloch each involved
situations where NLRA regulation “would necessitate inquiry into the
‘internal discipline and order’ of a foreign vessel,” 125 the Court remarked
that the longshoremen’s “casual” involvement with the foreign ships in
no way implicated their internal affairs. 126
III. SPECTOR V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE LTD.
Spector was the first case in twenty years that presented the Court with
a domestic statute arguably implicating the internal affairs of a visiting
foreign ship. 127 The Court resolved little in the case, however, as the Justices varied greatly in their readings of the aforementioned Jones Act and
National Labor Relations Act cases.
A. Background
The plaintiffs in Spector were disabled individuals who purchased
round-trip tickets for cruises aboard two Bahamian-flagged Norwegian
Cruise Line (NCL) 128 ships. 129 The cruises departed from Houston,
Texas and sailed to foreign ports of call. 130 During their vacations, the
plaintiffs discovered that many of the ships facilities—public restrooms,
swimming pools, restaurants, elevators, preferred cabins—were inaccessible to them. 131 Furthermore, the plaintiffs discovered that NCL main122. 397 U.S. 195 (1970).
123. Id. at 196–97.
124. Id. at 200.
125. Id. at 198 (quoting McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 19).
126. Id. at 199–200.
127. Similar to Benz and McCulloch, the Court in Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v.
American Radio Ass’n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974), held that picketing of two foreign-flagged
vessels by American unions to protest substandard wages paid to foreign seamen was an
activity affecting the ships’ internal operations, and thus was not covered by the Labor
Management Relations Act.
128. NCL is a Bermudian corporation offering cruise vacations departing from and
returning to United States ports. NCL Corporation Ltd., Annual Report (Form 20-F), at
14 (Mar. 28, 2006).
129. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126.
130. Id.
131. Brief for the Petitioners at 17–24, Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545
U.S. 119 (2005) (No. 03-1388), 2004 WL 2803188.
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tained several policies which were applicable to them but not to other
passengers. For instance, NCL charged higher fares and special surcharges on account of the plaintiffs’ disabilities and required them to remain subject to removal from the ship should their presence endanger the
“comfort” of the other passengers. 132
Upset over their treatment, the plaintiffs filed suit claiming NCL discriminated against them in violation of Title III of the ADA. 133 Title III
prohibits discrimination based on disability in places of “public accommodation” 134 and in “specified public transportation services.” 135 To that
end, Title III requires covered entities to make “reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures” to accommodate disabled persons, 136 and to remove physical barriers where “readily achievable.” 137
While allowing many of the claims to go forward, the district court
dismissed those pertaining to barrier removal on the grounds that the
governing ADA compliance regulations did not specifically cover cruise
ships. 138 The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, declaring
that the clear statement rule precluded any application of federal law to
visiting foreign ships without specific evidence of congressional intent. 139 Finding nothing in either the ADA’s text or legislative history to
indicate that Congress had thought about Title III’s application to foreign
cruise ships, the Fifth Circuit held that Title III was wholly inapplicable. 140
B. The Supreme Court’s Opinions
1. The Holding of the Court
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment, criticizing it
as being “inconsistent with the Court’s case law and with sound princi132. Id. at 20.
133. Spector, 545 U.S. at 126.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
135. Id. § 12184(a).
136. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), 12184(b)(2)(A).
137. Id. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), 12184(b)(2)(C).
138. Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 2002 WL 34100212 (S.D. Tex. 2002). On
November 26, 2004, the responsible agencies did finally issue draft guidelines for cruise
ships as well as a notice of proposed rulemaking. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of
Disability: Passenger Vessels, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,246 (Nov. 26, 2004) (to be codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 37); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) Accessibility Guidelines for Passenger Vessels, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,244 (Nov. 26, 2004) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt.
1195).
139. Spector, 356 F.3d at 646.
140. Id. at 650.
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ples of statutory interpretation.” 141 In particular, the five-Justice majority 142 held that the Fifth Circuit’s articulation of the clear statement rule
was too expansive, and that the rule could not be understood as blanketly
applying to foreign ships in their entirety. 143 The majority found that
cruise ships fall within Title III’s definitions of “public accommodation”
and “specified public transportation services.” 144 Thus, said the majority,
the ADA’s basic requirements on accommodation of disabled persons
presumptively apply to all cruise ships operating in American waters,
whether foreign or domestic. 145 The majority then noted that any structural modifications which would bring a ship into non-compliance with
its international obligations 146 would not be “readily achievable” and
therefore not be required by Title III. 147
Thus, while acknowledging that some of the plaintiffs’ claims were potentially barred, the majority rejected the Fifth Circuit’s determination
that the ADA was altogether inapplicable to foreign cruise ships. More
importantly for purposes of this discussion, the majority unambiguously
held that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted the clear statement rule. The
majority could not agree, however, on how exactly the rule worked. Already divided on the issue of whether the clear statement rule disqualified any application of the ADA to foreign cruise ships, 148 the Court diverged further as the majority splintered on the question of what limitations the rule imposed.

141. Spector, 545 U.S. at 130.
142. Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, and Stevens constituted the majority.
143. Spector, 545 U.S at 130.
144. Id. at 129.
145. Id. at 132–33.
146. There is an open question here as to what exactly the majority would exclude
under Title III’s “readily achievable” standard, since “international legal obligation” was
not well defined. See id. at 135. A simple solution might be to say that an international
legal obligation is the same as an obligation of international law. If indeed these terms are
equivalent, then rules of customary international law, and therefore the internal affairs
rule, would be included in the definition. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 56, at 41–55 (explaining that international custom is a source of international law). It is unlikely that this
is what the majority intended, however, since those parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion
dealing with the internal affairs rule did not command a majority vote. The majority
probably intended international legal obligations to mean “treaty obligations,” since they
cite as an example the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1,
1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 164 U.N.T.S. 113. See Spector, 545 U.S. at 135.
147. Id. at 135–36.
148. The dissenting Justices—O’Connor, Rehnquist, and Scalia—answered this question in the affirmative. For a discussion of their view, see infra Part III.B.4.
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2. The Plurality Opinion
Three of the Justices from the majority—Kennedy, Souter, and
Stevens—equated the clear statement rule with the internal affairs rule.
Calling it “the internal affairs clear statement rule,” the plurality declared
that the rule, absent a clear expression of congressional intent to do otherwise, would simply preclude those applications of the ADA which affect the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships. 149 For instance, they reasoned that NCL’s policies of charging disabled persons higher fares and
reserving the right to remove them “have nothing to do with [the] ship’s
internal affairs,” so the rule would not prevent Title III from applying to
those discriminatory policies in full force. 150 On the other hand, the accessibility claims seeking removal of coamings 151 and other structural
barriers “likely would interfere with the internal affairs of foreign ships,”
thus requiring a clear statement from Congress to achieve that end. 152
Additionally, the plurality stated that the clear statement rule did not
mandate an all-or-nothing approach to the applicability of a particular
statute. Rather, the rule exempts from the reach of domestic legislation
only those applications which implicate “the internal order and discipline
of the vessel, rather than the peace of the port.” 153
3. The Concurring Opinion
The remaining two Justices from the majority—Breyer and Ginsburg—did not ascribe any further significance to the clear statement rule.
They stated that the rule’s sole purpose lays in avoiding conflicts with
international obligations, and since the majority’s interpretation of the
ADA’s “readily achievable” standard fulfilled that purpose, nothing
more was required. 154 In their view, the extent to which Title III implicated the internal affairs of foreign ships was completely irrelevant. 155
The concurring Justices concluded that domestic law should apply to
visiting foreign vessels, even when it affects the ship’s internal affairs, so
149. Spector, 545 U.S. at 138. Justice Kennedy stated that “[t]he relevant category for
which the Court demands a clear congressional statement . . . consists not of all applications of a statute to foreign-flag vessels but only those applications that would interfere
with the foreign vessel’s internal affairs.” Id. at 132.
150. Id. at 133.
151. Coamings are the raised edges around a ship’s doors and other openings designed
keep water out. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 353 (4th ed. 2000).
152. Spector, 545 U.S. at 135.
153. Id. at 130. It should be noted here that Justice Thomas agreed with this assessment
of the rule’s operation and joined in this part of the plurality’s opinion.
154. Id. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 145.
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long as “there is good reason to apply our own law” and no potential for
“international discord” exists. 156
4. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting Justices, like the plurality, thought that the clear statement rule incorporated the internal affairs rule when the application of
American law to visiting foreign ships was at issue. 157 Indeed, they understood the internal affairs rule to be an established rule of international
law. 158 Despite this shared belief, the dissent disagreed with the plurality
and majority on two points. First, the dissent stated that any application
of domestic legislation implicating the internal affairs of a ship would
trigger the clear statement rule, thus preventing that application. 159 Consequently, the dissent declined to accept the majority’s invitation to construe Title III’s “readily achievable” standard to avoid conflicts with international obligations. 160 As they saw things, the clear statement rule
achieved that result on its own. 161 Second, parting ways with the plurality, the dissenting Justices thought that the ADA and other statutes could
not be selectively applied under the rule. 162 In their view, since some applications of Title III would affect the internal affairs of foreign cruise
ships, the absence of a clear congressional statement rendered the entire
statute inapplicable. 163
IV. ANALYSIS
Spector’s holding with respect to the clear statement rule is rather limited. The Court clearly rejected the position taken by the Fifth Circuit
that the rule applies to visiting foreign ships in toto. However, this is as
far as the majority went. Left unresolved were questions regarding both
the scope of the rule and its operation. First, an open issue remains as to
whether the clear statement rule tracks the internal affairs rule, or

156. Id.
157. Id. at 149 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The plurality correctly recognizes that Congress must clearly express its intent to apply its laws to foreign-flag ships when those
laws interfere with the ship’s internal order.”).
158. Id. at 150.
159. Id. at 155.
160. Id. at 153–54.
161. Id. at 154.
162. Id. at 156.
163. Id. at 157 (“Since some applications of Title III plainly affect the internal order of
foreign-flag ships, the absence of a clear statement renders the statute inapplicable—even
though some applications of the statute, if severed from the rest, would not require a clear
statement.”).
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whether it instead seeks only to avoid international conflicts. Second,
assuming that the clear statement rule’s scope is defined by the internal
affairs rule, the issue of whether the rule operates on a provision-byprovision or an all-or-nothing basis remains undecided. Both of these
questions will be considered in turn, and it will be argued that the plurality’s position provides the proper standards.
A. The Scope of the Rule: Confirming the Internal Affairs Rule
Though not reflected in the Court’s holding, a majority of the Justices
in Spector confirmed the vitality of the internal affairs rule. Seven Justices held the view that the clear statement rule requires specific congressional intent before domestic statutes will be construed to interfere with
the internal affairs of visiting foreign ships. 164 This interpretation of the
clear statement rule’s scope is correct since it confers on flag states the
deference over regulation of their ships’ internal matters long afforded
them by both the United States and the international community. 165
1. Correcting the Concurrence
The idea of the “internal affairs clear statement rule” was not unanimously accepted, however, as the two concurring Justices declared that
the clear statement rule’s scope went no further than avoiding conflicts
with international legal obligations. 166 Supporting their conclusion, the
concurring Justices stated that Benz and McCulloch simply held that
congressional statutes should not be construed so as to violate international obligations when other interpretations remain available. 167 Reading the internal affairs rule into the clear statement rule, for them, then,
was an over-inclusive means of avoiding such conflicts since doing so
would preclude applying domestic legislation in cases where no conflict
exists.
This position is problematic for several reasons. First, the concurring
Justices’ conclusion rests on an incomplete interpretation of Benz and
McCulloch. Those cases did indeed hold the NLRA inapplicable to the
foreign ships in question for fear of provoking international discord,168
164. Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Souter, Stevens, Thomas, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist all held this view. See supra Parts III.B.2 and III.B.4.
165. See supra Part I.
166. See supra Part III.B.3; see also supra note 146 (discussing the ambiguity of the
term “international legal obligation”).
167. Spector, 545 U.S. at 143–44 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
168. The Court in Benz stated that it would not hold the NLRA applicable to the foreign ship’s labor relations without a clear congressional statement, since to do otherwise
would “run interference in such a delicate field of international relations.” Benz, 353 U.S
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but hardly by paying lip service to the vessels’ internal affairs. Rather,
Benz and McCulloch identified the NLRA’s intrusive effect on the ships’
internal labor affairs as being the root cause of the conflict, 169 which is
why McCulloch cited as authority the “rule of international law that the
law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal affairs of a ship.” 170
Second, in arriving at their conception of the clear statement rule, the
concurring Justices appear to conflate two related canons of statutory
construction, the internal affairs rule and the Charming Betsy canon. Derived from Chief Justice Marshall’s statement in Murray v. Schooner
Charming Betsy 171 that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains,” 172 the Charming Betsy canon’s principal aim is to harmonize
domestic law with international law. 173 The majority’s interpretation of
Title III’s “readily achievable” standard to avoid conflicts with international legal obligations is a good example of the Charming Betsy canon
at work. 174 However, while the plurality thought more was needed from
the clear statement rule since foreign ships were involved, the concurring
Justices did not. The plurality was right. Relying solely on the Charming
Betsy canon under these circumstances is impractical given that port
state law and flag state law are not always amenable to harmonization. 175
When the two laws conflict, courts must sometimes abandon harmonization efforts and focus instead on determining which law will prevail.
Here is where the internal affairs rule shows its worth, since its raison
d’être is to answer that question.
As an aside, it is possible that the “errors” just discussed were an attempt by the concurring Justices to strip the internal affairs of visiting
foreign ships of the partial immunity to which they are currently enti-

at 147. Similarly, in McCulloch, the Court remarked that ruling in favor of NLRA regulation “would raise considerable disturbance . . . in our international relations.” McCulloch,
372 U.S. at 19.
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21.
171. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
172. Id. at 118.
173. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 484 (1998).
174. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
175. Such is the case whenever port state law and flag state law truly conflict, a frequent occurrence in foreign vessel actions. Indeed, in many of the Supreme Court’s cases
involving the application of domestic law to visiting foreign ships, the governments of
the vessels involved have filed briefs alerting the Court to the existence of a conflict of
laws. See Symeon Symeonides, Maritime Conflicts of Law from the Perspective of Modern Choice of Law Methodology, 7 MAR. LAW. 223, 224–25 (1982).
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tled. 176 While this “solves” the problems just mentioned, such an approach creates new problems of its own. First, pragmatically speaking,
its excessive self-interestedness is counterproductive. To be sure, no one
expects port states to sacrifice their own policies out of sheer altruistic
concern for those of flag states, and international law is clear that flag
state jurisdiction yields to port state jurisdiction. 177 However, it is unjust
and unfair for vessels to expect that their conditions might vary with each
port at which they call. Moreover, this move towards territorial exclusivity will not only wreck havoc on the international shipping industry, 178
but will also “invite retaliatory action from other nations.” 179 Second,
from an international law perspective, this shift is illegal. Unless stripping foreign ships of their partial internal affairs immunity is attained by
treaty or other agreement, one state’s unilateral disregard for that immunity is contrary to international law. 180 That this act might signal the beginning of a new general practice among nations, thus eventually altering
customary international law, will not save that act from the stigma of
illegality. 181 If such a shift in international law is indeed desired, then
concerted action by formal agreement should be pursued rather than unilateral action in defiance of existing law. 182
176. That this may have been the concurring Justices’ ulterior motive is signaled by the
advocacy of some commentators that the United States take such an approach. See, e.g.,
R. Tali Epstein, Comment, Should the Fair Labor Standards Act Enjoy Extraterritorial
Application?: A Look at the Unique Case of Flags of Convenience, 13 U. PA. J. INT’L
BUS. L. 653 (1993) (arguing that stripping foreign ships of their partial internal affairs
immunity will benefit the American labor force).
177. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
179. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21.
180. See JANIS, supra note 56, at 41–44 (describing the binding nature of customary
international law).
181. See Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law:
Customary International Law and Some of Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523, 531–32
(2004).
182. That the United States once held this opinion and acted upon it is revealed by
instructions sent from Washington to the American Minister in Madrid on October 28,
1852, during discussions arising out of the treatment accorded to an American vessel, The
Crescent City, by the officials of Spain in Cuba. In those instructions it was said:
You will state that this government does not question the right of every nation
to prescribe the conditions on which vessels of other nations may be admitted
into her ports. That, nevertheless, those conditions ought not to conflict with
the received usages which regulate the commercial intercourse among civilized
nations. That those usages are well known and long established and no nation
can disregard them without giving just cause of complaint to all other nations
whose interests would be affected by their violation.
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2. The Internal Affairs Rule and Modern Conflict of Laws Methodology
Another argument in favor of the clear statement rule incorporating the
internal affairs rule is that the internal affairs rule is consistent with modern conflict of laws 183 theory, “interest analysis” 184 in particular. When
port states seek to apply their laws to visiting foreign ships, true conflicts
routinely arise. Such is the case whenever port state law and flag state
law differ and the policies underlying each have a genuine claim to application. 185 In this situation, interest analysis holds that port state courts
should normally apply port state law. 186 Because of the concurrent flag
state interests, however, interest analysis also asserts that port state courts
may take “a more moderate and restrained interpretation” of port state
law. 187 This means that port state courts may recognize the applicability
of port state law, but, in deference to the contrary interest of the flag
state, will decline to assert for the port state an interest in having its law
applied. 188
This is all that the internal affairs rule requires. The rule presumes that
port states do not intend to interfere with matters that are primarily of
concern only to the ship and its flag state. If, however, those matters affect the peace of the port, then that presumption is effectively rebutted.
Thus, the internal affairs rule does not seek to simply subserviate port
state law to flag state law, but rather to mitigate the tension when the two
conflict. This sensitivity to the substantive aspects of the two laws demonstrates the internal affairs rule’s compatibility with prevailing conflict
of laws theory.
H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO. 86, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., at 24 (1853).
183. Conflict of laws is that branch of jurisprudence which deals with disputes subject
to the conflicting laws of two or more states. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 299–300 (6th
ed. 1990).
184. Developed by Professor Brainerd Currie, interest analysis seeks “to ensure that
the law which is applied in the majority of cases will be the one whose application in a
particular context will serve the purposes for which that law was created.” Gregory E.
Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1047 (1987).
185. See id.
186. See Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
1959 DUKE L.J. 171, 178.
187. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963).
188. A judicial operation of this sort was famously performed in Bernkrant v. Fowler,
360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961), where Justice Roger Traynor, after observing that California
would be constitutionally justified in applying its Statute of Frauds to deny a claim
against the estate of a local domiciliary, chose not to attribute to the California legislature
an intent to preclude enforcement of an oral agreement executed in Nevada for the benefit
of Nevada domiciliaries when Nevada had no similar statute in accordance with its policy
of vindicating the reasonable expectations of its people.
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B. The Rule’s Operation: A Provision-by-Provision Argument
The debate within the Supreme Court over whether the clear statement
rule applies on a provision-by-provision or all-or-nothing basis proved
more contentious than that over the rule’s scope, as the Justices closely
split four to three favoring the former approach over the latter. 189 The
plurality reasoned that since the NLRA was held applicable in Ariadne
but not in Benz and McCulloch, 190 the same provision-by-provision approach should be taken with respect to the ADA. 191 Specifically, the plurality thought that the clear statement rule would restrain only those Title
III provisions which touched upon the vessel’s internal affairs, leaving
all the remaining provisions effective. 192
The dissenting Justices believed that the plurality’s approach encompassed an “utterly implausible” view of congressional intent. 193 They
stated that Congress could not have had separate intent with respect to
each provision of Title III, and that Congress either did or did not have
foreign ships in mind when it enacted the statute. 194 Consequently, since
Title III did not contain a clear statement as to its applicability to foreign
vessels, the fact that some of its provisions implicated their internal affairs necessarily rendered the entire statute inapplicable. 195 The dissent,
therefore, took the plurality to task for attempting to force foreign ships
into compliance with Title III requirements that were never intended to
apply to them. 196
While the dissenting Justices’ argument is persuasive at a glance,
closer inspection reveals that it rests on an inconsistency in reasoning.
The dissent, like the plurality, threw its support behind the internal affairs rule, a rule that presumes Congress does intend its laws to regulate
the non-internal affairs of foreign vessels. Thus admitting Congress’s
intent to regulate the non-internal affairs of foreign vessels, the dissent
cannot fairly argue that a provision-by-provision approach, whereby noninternal matters are automatically subject to regulation while internal
matters require a clear statement, somehow fails to regard that intent.

189. See supra Parts III.B.2 and III.B.4. As an aside, the two concurring Justices,
though not in favor of the internal affairs rule conception of the clear statement rule,
noted that they agreed with the plurality’s provision-by-provision approach to the rule.
Spector, 545 U.S. at 143 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. Spector, 545 U.S. at 138.
192. Id. at 138–39.
193. Id. at 156 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 157.
196. Id. at 156.

660

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 32:2

Rather than “delusional,” 197 it is entirely rational to believe that Congress
intends some provisions of its statutes to apply to visiting foreign ships
while intending exemptions with regards to others. 198 Moreover, the plurality’s adoption of the provision-by-provision approach adheres not only
to previous Court practice with respect to this clear statement rule, 199 but
with other clear statement rules as well. 200
V. CONCLUSION
The clear statement rule is the canon of statutory construction employed by American courts to determine the applicability of U.S. law to
visiting foreign ships. Due to the ever-increasing number of foreign vessels calling on American ports, there is a great need for a more definite
and authoritative restatement of that rule. Indeed, while considering the
applicability of the ADA to foreign cruise ships, the Court in Spector
was well aware that its decision would have important implications for
the applicability of other statutes as well. 201 It is therefore unfortunate
that the Justices could not come to an agreement on the rule’s scope or
operation.
While the uncertainty over the proper standards to apply to the clear
statement rule may not have been fully resolved in Spector, the case nevertheless provides an answer. By assimilating the internal affairs rule and
the provision-by-provision approach into its articulation of the clear
statement rule, the plurality adhered to the traditional American viewpoint and exercised due regard for international law. There is reason,

197. Id.
198. The dissenting Justices are likely correct that Congress did not “in fact” have
individualized intent with respect to each provision of Title III. See id. However, it defies
reality to expect Congress to have foreseen and considered every contingency arising
under the statute. Given this situation, the determination that courts need to make is
“what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to it.” Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 993 (2d Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.).
199. See supra Part II.
200. For example, the Court took the same provision-by-provision approach when it
applied the “presumption against extraterritoriality” to a couple of cases involving the
Seamen’s Act of 1915. Compare Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920)
(holding that Section 4 of the Act does apply extraterritorially to invalidate wage advancements), with Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185 (1918) (holding that Section 11
of the Act does not apply extraterritorially to invalidate wage advancements).
201. In rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s articulation of the clear statement rule, the plurality
noted the adverse consequences that such a broad reading of the rule would have for Title
II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
in scattered section of 42 U.S.C.). See Spector, 545 U.S. at 132.
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therefore, to expect that their opinion will be followed in future cases
going forward.
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